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THE NUMBERS GAME: STATISTICAL 
INFERENCE IN DISCRIMINATION CASES 
.David H. Kaye* 
STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION. By .David Baldus and 
James Cole. Colorado Springs: Shepard's, Inc. 1980. Pp. xx, 376. 
$55. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes once remarked that "[f]or the rational 
study oflaw the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but 
the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of eco-
nomics." 1 To many of his day, this "man of statistics" may have 
seemed like the perfect attorney for Holmes's quintessential client, 
"the bad man."2 The two of them, Holmes might have said, would 
"stink in the nostrils" of those who would introduce as much fuzzi-
ness into the law as they could.3 Presently, however, there are those 
who proclaim that Holmes's prophecy has come true.4 To be sure, 
the proper role for microeconomic analysis in legal discourse contin-
ues to be hotly debated,5 but few would deny that quantitative meth-
ods are becoming increasingly important in litigation. Especially in 
cases alleging discrimination, judges and commentators have ob-
served that "statistics often tell much, and the Courts listen."6 
Whether this infusion of numerical methods into legal proceedings 
evokes feelings of approbation or revulsion, it seems clear that at 
least a rudimentary knowledge of statistical reasoning is essential if 
attorneys and judges are to function effectively in discrimination 
litigation. 
• Professor of Law, Arizona State University. S.B. 1968, Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology; M.A. 1969, Harvard University; J.D. 1972, Yale Law School. The author wishes to 
thank Mikel Aickin for thoughtful and insightful comments on a draft of this Review. - Ed. 
1. Holmes, The Path of the Law, IO HARV. L. REV. 457,469 (1897). 
2. Id at 459-61. 
3. Id at 462. 
4. On leaving the deanship at the Stanford Law School, Charles Meyers opined that "with-
out knowing basic economics, lawyers simply will be unable to cope with the last fifth of the 
20th century and the next century." Charles Meyers: Law School Visionary, CALlFORNlA 
LAWYER, Oct 1981, at 47. 
5. E.g., Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. 
REV. 387 (1981). . 
6. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRlMlNATION LAW 1162 (1976) (quoting 
Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1962)). 
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This, at any rate, is the thesis propounded by David Baldus, a 
professor of law at the University of Iowa,7 and James Cole, a con-
sulting statistician from Pittsburgh. 8 In Statistical Proof of .Discrimi-
nation they argue that quantitative approaches to detecting 
discrimination have much to offer. Because they recognize that these 
methods, like other powerful tools, can be dangerous if not handled 
carefully, they have not written a treatise cataloging and indexing 
every discrimination case that has discussed statistical proof. In-
stead, they have crafted a primer for the mathematical neophyte on 
how statistical techniques ought to be used in ascertaining whether a 
plaintiff has established a prima facie case9 of discrimination. 10 The 
authors employ four hypothetical cases to illustrate various statistical 
methods, both descriptive and inferential. They weave these para-
digmatic cases into the fabric of established decisions. The result is a 
rich tapestry of quantitative analysis and legal doctrine. Baldus and 
Cole write at the frontiers of existing case law, and their work will 
almost certainly exert a powerful influence on the law governing the 
proof of discrimination. 11 
Of course, none of this means that Statistical Proof of .Discrimina-
tion is beyond the pale of all criticism. The writing is generally care-
ful, but sometimes less than pellucid.12 At some points, it borders on 
7. Professor Baldus, who also served as the Director of the National Science Foundation's 
Law and Social Sciences Program, has written several important articles on quantitative tech-
niques. E.g., Baldus, Pulaski, Woodworth & Kyle, Identifying Comparatively Excessive 
Sentences of IJeath: A Quantitative Approach, 33 STAN. L. REV. l (1980). 
8. Dr. Cole, formerly an assistant professor of statistics at the University of Iowa, also 
collaborated with Professor Baldus in Baldus & Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten 
Sellin and Isaac Ehrlich on the JJeterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170 (1975). 
9. The omission of explicit analysis of the use of statistical evidence in rebutting the prima 
facie case has occasioned some criticism. See, Gruner, Book Review, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV, 
441, 447-48 (1981). 
10. Despite the care that Baldus and Cole take in presenting statistical methods in simple 
terms, the statistically naive reader should not assume that the book will give him everything 
he needs to undertake statistical studies, to test whether the assumptions of a statistical model 
hold in an actual case, or even to hire a statistical consultant wisely. See Gerjuoy, Book Re-
view, 66 A.B.A. J. 1100 (1980). For instance, there is no discussion of some common ways in 
which even a correctly computed correlation coefficient can be misleading, cj A. EDWARDS, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR REGRESSION AND CORRELATION 55-61 (1976) (problems with 
small samples, combining samples, and restriction of range), or of the power of a classical 
hypothesis test. See note 40 infra. 
I offer this observation more as a caution to the over-enthusiastic reader than as a criticism 
of the book. Any nonmathematical treatment of a mathematical subject can convey only a 
limited understanding (as any reader of Scient!ftc American knows). Just as Statistical Proof of 
JJiscrimination is not an exhaustive legal treatise, so too it is not a comprehensive statistics text. 
It does, however, contain ample references to such texts. 
11. For example, Statistical Proof contains the most elaborate analysis yet written for at-
torneys on how discrepancies between outcomes that would be expected in the absence of 
discrimination and outcomes that are observed should be quantified. Pp. 144-60. 
12. In their introductory assessment of quantitative proof, for instance, Baldus and Cole 
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the tedious. 13 Although the preponderance of the arguments is con-
vincing, a few are obscure14 or troublesome. 15 But I do not desire to 
belabor these occasional flaws or to detail for their own sake the or-
ganization or themes of the book. Other reviewers have traveled 
these roads. 16 In the remainder of this Review, I hope to describe 
more fully the sort of issues with which Baldus and Cole are con-
cerned, to describe how a few of their insights might apply in the 
context of a specific case, and to consider briefly some approaches 
that depart from the classical statistical methodology that the au-
thors pursue. I shall begin by describing the Supreme Court's disap-
list as an "advantage of statistical proof' the fact that "[i]t can . . . provide a reliable basis for 
inferring why individuals have been disadvantaged by a selection process," and they refer to 
the capacity of statistical analysis "to assess causal arguments." Pp. 4-5. They then state that 
"[t]he primary limitation of quantitative proof ... is its inability to support an inference about 
the reasons for a particular decision, such as why a certain individual was hired or fired . . . ." 
P. 5. Some of the confusion may be engendered by the unexplained use of the word "causal," 
which has a special meaning in multivariate statistics. See Cohn, Book Review, 55 N.Y.U. L. 
R.Ev. 1295, 1302-10 (1980). I understand Baldus and Cole to be saying two things here: 
(1) that statistical methods can demonstrate that a selection or allocation process has burdened 
or benefited one group more than another, but this analysis cannot by itself establish the moti-
vation behind this selection procedure; and (2) that even where the quantitative evidence 
reveals a difference in the way two groups are treated, a further inference is required to con-
clude anything about individuals in these groups. 
13. Thus, the first chapter on "Discrimination and Models of Proof' (pp. 9-52) enumerates 
four "theories" (also called "models") of discrimination and another three "models" of proof 
of the disparate treatment theory or model. Although analytic precision may warrant this 
proliferation of concepts, one wonders whether the social scientists and statisticians for whom 
this chapter is written, see p. 4, will not find more accessible overviews of the pertinent legal 
doctrines elsewhere. 
14. For example, in arguing that it is usually desirable to measure adverse impact by a 
simple difference between two numbers (as opposed to a ratio), Baldus and Cole state that 
"our analysis of the cases suggests that the assumption of the difference measure better approx-
imates the disutility structure underlying the law in more situations than does the assumption 
of the ratio measure." Moreover, they add, "we suggest that this will continue to be true in the 
future, although in some respects it is an empirical question depending strictly on the facts of 
the cases." P. 149. They do not explain how they were able to discern this underlying disutil-
ity structure in the unnamed cases they have in mind. 
15. See note 69 infra. Consider also what Baldus and Cole say about the relation of the 
ratio measure of adverse impact to the utility of money as a function of income: 
The argument for ratios in wage and similar benefit cases rests on the generally accepted 
premise that a $1,000 deprivation of salary is less important to someone in the $20,000 
range than to someone in the $10,000 range. Consequently, a $1,000 deprivation may 
represent greater harm to someone in the latter group than to someone in the former. 
Moreover, it may well be that the 5 percent loss of $1,000 to someone in the $20,000 
income range represents the same actual harm as would a 5 percent loss of $500 to some-
one earning $10,000 per year. If this is true, it would also tend to support the use of a ratio 
measure in these cases, smce the percentage loss or relative disparity IS simply one form of 
the ratio measure. 
P. 155. The problem is that neither the claim that the utility of money is a logarithmic function 
of income nor the contention that interpersonal comparisons of utility are meaningful is "gen-
erally accepted" by psychologists, economists and others who have investigated and developed 
the theory of utility. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND 0PERATI0!'1S ANALYSIS 
193-95, 421-32 (4th ed. 1977). 
16. See Cohn, supra note 12; Gerjuoy, supra note 10; Gruner, supra note 9. 
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pointing treatment of statistical proof in Hazelwood School .District v. 
United States, 11 a well-known employment discrimination case. 
Second, I shall indicate what the attorney who has mastered Statisti-
cal Proof of .Discrimination might have to say about this unhappy 
opinion. Finally, I shall examine the statistical evidence in Hazel-
wood with the aid of two theories of statistical inference not seri-
ously considered in Statistical Proof. 
l. HAZELWOOD V. UNITED STATES AND ''THE MAN 
OF STATISTICS" 
In Hazelwood, the United States brought an action under title 
VII against a St. Louis County, Missouri, school district. The gov-
ernment alleged that the district was engaging in a "pattern or prac-
tice" of discrimination in hiring teachers. To demonstrate the 
existence and extent of this pattern, the government pointed to, 
among other things, data showing that although 15.4% of the teach-
ers in the geographical region were black, the comparable proportion 
among Hazelwood's teaching staff was only 1.4% and 1.8% in 1972-
1973 and 1973-1974, respectively. 
The district court held that these statistics were "nonprobative" 
on the curious ground that the percentage of black students in the 
school district was also trifiing.18 This amounts to saying that a 
school district can refuse to hire black teachers as long as there are 
not too many black students around. The court of appeals reversed 
and directed judgment for the government. It reasoned that the 
proper comparison was between the proportion of black teachers in 
the Hazelwood district and the proportion of black teachers in the 
labor market from which the district drew its teachers. If many 
black teachers were available for employment, but only few were 
hired, it would be natural to suspect ~t the hiring process was bi-
ased against blacks. The court of appeals thus held that the figures 
given above constituted a prima facie (and unrebutted) case of racial 
discrimination. 
The Supreme Court differed with the court of appeals. To be 
sure, it agreed that the district court's reasoning was "fundamentally 
misconceived,"19 which is a polite way to put it, but it questioned 
whether the relevant labor market included the City of St. Louis. It 
observed that if the city were excluded from the market, the percent-
17. 433 U.S. 299 (1977). 
18. 433 U.S. at 304. 
19. 433 U.S. at 308. 
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age of black teachers would plummet from 15.4 to 5.7, which would 
put things more in line with the figures for Hazelwood's staff. It 
therefore vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and re-
manded the case to the trial court for findings on the scope of the 
relevant labor market. 
To support its intuition that with the City of St. Louis excluded, 
the statistics might not create a prima facie case, the Court offered a 
learned footnote seemingly steeped in statistical wisdom: 
[U]nder the statistical methodology . . . involving the calculation of 
the standard deviation as a measure of predicted fluctuations, the dif-
ference between using 15.4% and 5.7% as the areawide figure would be 
significant. If the 15.4% figure is taken as the basis for comparison, the 
expected number of Negro teachers hired by Hazelwood in 1972-73 
would be 43 (rather than the actual figure of 10) of a total of 282, a 
difference of more than five standard deviations; the expected number 
in 1973-74 would be 19 (rather than the actual figure of 5) of a total of 
123, a difference of more than three standard deviations. For the two 
years combined, the difference between the observed number of 15 Ne-
gro teachers hired ( of a total of 405) would vary from the expected 
number of 62 by more than six standard deviations. Because a fluctua-
tion of more than two or three standard deviations would undercut the 
hypothesis that decisions were being made randomly with respect to 
race . . . each of those statistical calculations would reinforce rather 
than rebut the Government's other proof. If, however, the 5.7% area-
wide figure is used, the expected number of Negro teachers hired in 
1972-1973 would be roughly 16, less than two standard deviations from 
the observed number of 10; for 1973-1974, the expected value would be 
roughly seven, less than one standard deviation from the observed 
value of 5; and for the two years combined, the expected value of 23 
would be less than two standard deviations from the observed total of 
15,20 
To readers not versed in statistics, this footnote must seem formida-
ble indeed. Yet, the essence of what the Court is saying is obvious 
enough, and an attentive reading of Statistical Proof of .Discrimina-
tion should dispel most of the mystery.21 Even if an employer makes 
hiring decisions without regard to race, it is always possible that the 
proportion of blacks hired will differ slightly from the proportion in 
the pool of all the applicants. Even large discrepancies are possible, 
though they are less likely than small ones. This phenomenon of 
random fluctuation, or sampling error, is familiar enough. After all, 
20. 433 U.S. at 311 n.17. 
21. For Baldus's and Cole's explanation of the Hazelwood calculations, see pp. 294-97. See 
generally w. CONNOLLY, JR. & D. PETERSON, USE OF STATISTICS IN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 
LITIGATION 74-83 (1979); C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY 
LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 78-80 (1980); Braun, Statistics and the Law: Hypothe-
sis Testing and Its Application to Title VII Cases, 32 HAsTINGS L.J. 59, 72-75 (1980). 
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if one tosses a balanced coin ten times, there can be no guarantee 
that exactly five heads will tum up. Similarly, if one blindly draws 
ten marbles from an um containing ten black marbles and ninety 
white ones, there is no guarantee that any particular number so ob-
tained will be black. By chance alone, all the marbles sampled 
might tum out to be white. Or, several might be black. · 
The mathematical theory of probability enables us to quantify 
the chances involved. In the example of the um, the probability that 
no black marbles will appear in any given sample of ten is a little 
less than .04. That is, even if the drawings were perfectly fair, the 
outcome would grossly favor whites (and perhaps appear biased) 
about four times out of every one hundred. 
Similarly, the Hazelwood Court is asserting that with the teachers 
in the City of St. Louis removed from the applicant pool, the seem-
ingly small proportion of black teachers hired is sufficiently close to 
the proportion in the labor market that the modest discrepancy has a 
good chance of arising from sampling error rather than from bias in 
hiring. Indeed, the Court says that the chance is so high that it may 
"weaken" the government's claim of discrimination.22 
Equipped with the explanations in Statistical Proef ef .Discrimina-
tion, an astute advocate or commentator should find fault with this 
conclusion on a variety of grounds.23 At the outset, he might ques-
tion the entire effort to compare the proportion of black teachers that 
the Hazelwood district had hired to the proportion of black teachers 
in the suburban schools as a whole. The comparison ideally should 
involve only those teachers available for employment with Hazel-
wood, and ordinarily those who have in fact applied provide the best 
indication of this pool of potential applicants.24 The Supreme Court, 
recognizing that data involving such teachers might be preferable to 
that used by the government, noted in remanding the case that "[i]t 
will be open to the District Court . . . to determine whether suffi-
ciently reliable applicant-flow data are available to permit consider-
22. 433 U.S. at 311. 
23. Baldus and Cole disapprove of rigid hypothesis testing at the .05 level, although they 
do not mention this view in their discussion of Hazelwood See p. 308. Oddly, most of the 
commentary of Hazelwood, even that which focuses on the Court's use of statistical reasoning, 
is almost entirely uncritical. See, e.g.' F. MORRIS, JR., CURRENT TRENDS IN THE UsE (AND 
MISUSE) OF STATISTICS IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 38-39 (2d ed. 1978); C. 
SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 21, at 78-80. 
24. Baldus and Cole argue that "a general presumption should exist in favor of actual 
applicant data as a preselection basis of comparison. • . . [T]he unavailability of actual appli-
cant data, or the possibility of distortion from the use of applicant flow data, can provide a 
basis for using a pool of potential applicants as a proxy for the people who would have applied 
under conditions of normal labor supply." P. 106 (footnote omitted). They offer guidelines for 
construction of such "proxy populations." Pp. 115-34. 
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ation of the . . argument that those data may undercut a statistical 
analysis dependent upon hirings alone."25 On this point, at least, the 
"man of statistics" will find that the Supreme Court's opinion passes 
muster. 
But the "man of statistics" will be sorely troubled by how the 
Court used the data before it. It may be trite to say that a little 
knowledge is a dangerous thing, but in the case of the statistical rea-
soning in Hazelwood it is true enough. In suggesting that a high 
probability of sampling error tends to prove the absence of discrimi-
nation, the Court is doing what careful statisticians always warn 
against - trying to prove the "null hypothesis."26 Under the classi-
cal theory of hypothesis testing, all that can be said is that the num-
bers do not compel us to reject the thought that the hiring process is 
free from racial discrimination. Of course, the failure to find some-
thing is usually a good indication that it is not there, but a statistical 
analysis of how a negative finding might ''weaken" the government's 
case would require techniques that go beyond the classical method-
ology to which the Court refers.27 
Moreover, even in its own terms, the Court's reasoning seems 
faulty. To see the problem, we must understand where the "rule" 
about two or three standard deviations comes from. The standard 
deviation is a measure of how widely varied a set of numbers is. 
(For those who like formulas, it is calculated by finding the mean of 
all the numbers, subtracting this mean from each number, squaring 
this difference for each number, adding all the squares together, di-
viding by size of the set, and finally extracting the square root of the 
resulting quantity.) When the disparity between the number of 
blacks actually hired and the number expected in a race-neutral pro-
cess (without any sampling error) is measured in units of standard 
deviations, it is easy to deduce the probability that the observed dis-
parity is the result of sampling error if certain conditions hold. For 
brevity, I shall not explain the details of this process. Suffice it to say 
that in situations where one has no idea in which direction the dis-
parity will lie, a discrepancy of roughly two standard deviations in a 
large, randomly drawn sample implies that the probability that such 
a difference would arise by chance alone is no more than .05, or one 
25. 433 U.S. at 313 n.21. 
26. In a rare article finding "fundamental flaws" in Hazelwood, Smith and Abram make 
this point. Smith & Abram, Quantitative Analysis and Proof of Employment JJiscrimination, 
1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 33, 52-53. 
27. See notes 70-73 infra and accompanying text. 
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out of twenty. Three standard deviations corresponds to a 
probability of about .001, or one out of a thousand. 
So the Hazelwood Court's reasoning comes down to this: With 
the City of St. Louis excluded from the labor market, the probability 
that so few blacks would be hired by reason of chance alone is larger 
than .05, and as long as this chance remains even slightly higher than 
this .05 level, the statistical evidence ''weakens" the claim that hiring 
is improperly influenced by race. Yet, modem statisticians do not 
woodenly insist on a significance level of .05. Although the .05 level 
has become conventional in social science research, most thoughtful 
statisticians deplore the convention and urge that researchers state 
the probability level involved to permit the reader to reach his own 
conclusion about the significance of the result.28 The fact that many 
social scientists feel that they should not claim to have discovered 
something new unless they can attach a probability value of less than 
.05 to the likelihood that they are merely observing sampling error 
hardly means that such small probability values are required in 
proving facts in civil cases.29 A researcher may not wish to rush into 
print only to be contradicted by his colleagues when they attempt to 
replicate his results. He may wait to gather more data instead of 
putting his reputation on the line and perhaps causing others to 
spend time and money verifying tentative and misleading results. 
The concerns and values of social science, however, do not necessar-
ily govern legal proceedings. In civil litigation, a less demanding 
more-probable-than-not standard is ordinarily employed. The 
Court is wrong in suggesting that a plaintiff does not make out a 
prima facie case under this standard unless the probability associ-
ated with sampling error is below .05.30 Depending on the other evi-
dence in the case, a much higher- or lower-value may suffice.31 
Furthermore, even if the arbitrary choice of the .05 level were 
more defensible, the attorney familiar with Statistical Proof of .Dis-
28. E.g., D. MOORE, STATISTICS: CONCEPTS AND CONTROVERSIES 291-93 (1979); Skipper, 
Guenther & Nass, The Sacredness of.OJ.· A Note Concerning the Uses of Statistical Levels of 
Sign!ficance in Social Science, in STATISTICAL IssuES: A READER FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCI• 
ENCES 141 (R. Kirk ed. 1972). 
29. See Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscemib/e" .Dflferences: Empirical Research and the 
Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH, L. REv. 644, 658-59 (1975). 
30. See Smith & Abram, supra note 26, at 43-44. 
31. Baldus and Cole also argue that the appropriate significance level will vary according 
to the type of discrimination case involved. P. 318. The only example they offer is a compari-
son of a challenge to a capital sentence and an attack on an employer's practices. If the signifi-
cance level should differ in these two situations, it must be because the burden of persuasion -
which turns on the relative costs of type I and type II errors, see, e.g., Kaplan, .Decision Theory 
and the Fact-Finding Process, 20 STAN, L. REv. 1065 (1968), - is a function of these costs. q: 
note 41 i'!fra ( discussing these types of mistakes). 
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crimination should wonder whether the Court was simply mistaken 
in concluding that the .05 test was not satisfied by the statistical evi-
dence in Hazelwood. I stated earlier that two standard deviations 
correspond to a probability of .05 !f. among other things, one has no 
reason to expect that the difference between the proportion for the 
labor pool and for the teachers hired will be in one direction as op-
posed to the other (a "two-tailed" test). In Hazelwood, however, the 
question is whether the employer is discriminating against a pro-
tected group. Therefore, the statistical problem in classical terms is 
to calculate how likely it is that the number of black teachers hired 
would be so much less than the number that race-neutral selection 
would produce in the absence of any sampling error.32 Putting the 
question this way requires a "one-tailed" test and implies that it 
takes not two, but only 1.64 standard deviations to reach the .05 
level. For the two-year period for which figures on hiring are de-
scribed in the Hazelwood opinion, the number of standard devia-
tions is less than two, as the Court states. But it is more than 1.64. 
By my calculation, it is 1.73, which corresponds to a probability of 
.04 of a sampling error. Consequently, one might well conclude that 
even at the demanding .05 level the Court arbitrarily selected, the 
chance that so few black teachers would be hired over the two-year 
period if selections really were independent of race is small enough 
to warrant rejecting the view that the school district did not discrimi-
nate against blacks. 
I hope that this evaluation of the use of statistical methods in 
Hazelwood does not foster the impression that statistical analysis 
should be avoided at all costs. The Court performed poorly in Ha-
zelwood not because it knew too much about statistical reasoning, 
but because it knew too little. Mathematical analysis cannot dictate 
answers to legal issues, but as Baldus and Cole urge, it can be a 
valuable aid in certain litigation. As the courts gain experience with 
statistical techniques in discrimination cases, they will learn to avoid 
32. In technical jargon this is to say that a one-tailed test should be used in preference to 
the Hazelwood two-tailed test. A law clerk to Justice Stevens appears to have recognized the 
issue. See Hazelwood v. United States, 433 U.S. at 318 n.5 {dissenting opinion). Baldus and 
Cole avoid taking a stand on this issue. They write that ''no strong conventions exist on the 
subject," but note that "statistics texts frequently recommend the use of a one-tailed test when 
the only question of interest is the likelihood of a difference in one direction .... " P. 307. 
They use two-tailed tests in their examples but suggest that "[s]ince there is no clear answer to 
this question, the most desirable approach is an awareness of the conceptual and practical 
differences between the two types of tests and a consistent use of the same type of test in 
similar cases whenever practical." P. 308. For a sampling of the social science literature on 
the propriety of one- versus two-tailed tests, see Jones, Tests of Hypotheses: One-Sided vs. 1wo-
Sided Altematives, in R. KIRK, supra note 28, at 276-90. 
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errors like those made in Hazelwood. In the meantime, the learning 
process is bound to be slow and, I fear, painful. 
II. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE? 
A. Must We Think About Statistical Signfftcance? 
In the hope of accelerating this learning process, I would like to 
canvass various alternatives to the hypothesis testing prospective 
adopted in Hazelwood.33 Four of the five approaches that I shall 
enumerate are discussed in Statistical Proof of Discrimination, al-
though the quality and depth of treatment varies widely. 
One such alternative is simply not to bother inquiring into statis-
tical significance at all. This is not an entirely frivolous suggestion. 
In Hazelwood itself, the Court noted that its calculations were "not 
intended to suggest that precise calculations of statistical significance 
are necessary in employing statistical proof . . . ."34 There is also 
some academic support for this view.35 Those of this persuasion who 
are also statistically sophisticated argue that "[w]hen the data com-
prise all the observations of the defendant's reward allocation pro-
cess (i.e., the [whole] universe or population of observations), 
statistical inferences and tests of statistical significance are 
inappropriate."36 
For anyone who appreciates Carlyle's quip that "I don't pretend 
to understand the Universe - it's a great deal bigger than I am,"37 
this "whole universe" argument fails. The numbers generated in a 
discrimination case describe only a sample of observations, but truly 
interesting conclusions concern a larger population. Statistical inf er-
ence - the process of saying something intelligent about an entire 
population on the basis of sample data - is therefore unavoidable. 
Take the hiring process in Hazelwood. Certain teachers interviewed 
33. The hypothesis testing in Hazelwood was presaged by a similar analysis (rejecting the 
null hypothesis) in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). In Castaneda, the Court recog-
nized that in speaking of how two or three standard deviations are necessary to establish statis-
tical significance, it was simply stating a convention adopted in social science. 430 U.S. at 496 
n.17. In Hazelwood the Court quoted from Castaneda, but it dropped Castaneda's qualifying 
language. 
34. 433 U.S. at 312 n.17. 
35. Cohn, supra note 12, at 1304-07; Cohn, On the Use of Statistics in Employment JJiscriml• 
nation Cases, 55 IND. L.J. 493, 494-99 (1980); authorities cited at p. 316 n.46. For contrary 
views see pp. 316-17; Shoben, In JJeftnse of JJisparate Impact Analysis Under Tille VII: A 
Reply to JJr. Cohn, 55 IND. LJ. 515 (1980); Smith & Abrams, supra note 26, at 42-43 (citing 
Freeman,Availability, Goals and Achievements in Affirmative Action: An Economic Perspective, 
in PERSPECTIVES ON AVAILABILITY 95, 110 (Equal Employment Advisory Council 1977)). 
36. Cohn, supra note 12, at 1305. 
37. D. SCIAMA, THE UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE 47 (1961) (quoting Carlyle). 
March 1982) The Numbers Game 843 
for jobs, and the school district hired some of them. Those who went 
through this process should be thought of as a sample drawn from 
the population of potential applicants. As a first approximation, 
those whom the school district hired can be treated as a sample 
drawn from this sample of actual applicants. Of course, the success-
ful interviewees were not hired at random, but if the characteristics 
legitimately considered in the hiring process are not correlated with 
race, then the probability model used by the Court is an appropriate 
one for estimating the probability that a sample selected on the basis 
of these criteria would contain so few black teachers. Surely, this 
probability (often called a p-value) is the kind of number that merits 
attention in determining whether a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion exists. A small enough p-value should lead us to think that the 
simple race-independent model of hiring describes the actual selec-
tion process poorly. We should then ask the defendant to provide a 
better model to rebut the charge of discrimination.38 As such, the 
temptation to ignore the question of statistical significance by invok-
ing the "whole universe" problem should be resisted. 
B. Unbridled Intuition 
Since statistical inferences must be made, one way or another, 
when quantitative evidence is introduced in discrimination cases, a 
method that is both logically defensible and intelligible to judges or 
juries should be employed. Elegant mathematical procedures are 
not the only possibility. Presented with a numerical disparity in 
group outcomes and the size of the sample giving rise to this statistic, 
38. Cohn contends that "[r]elying on tests of statistical significance, based on the assump-
tion that the unspecified determinants' effects on groups' outcomes are random, is a poor sub-
stitute for the proper modeling of the defendant's reward allocation process that would include 
all the relevant determinants of rewards." Cohn, supra note 12, at 1306. Speaking as a soci-
ologist about academic studies, he is correct. To build the most accurate and plausible model, 
one should include all the important independent variables (taking into account problems that 
small sample size and multicollinearity may create). The plaintiff in a law suit, however, 
should not be required to build such an elaborate model if (1) the statistics derived from the 
(inevitably) small sample data indicate that the cruder race-independent model does not come 
close to explaining the apparent underrepresentation of blacks or some other protected class, 
and (2) it would be difficult and expensive to develop the full model, or there is ample qualita-
tive evidence of discrimination. The second condition is important in light of the problem of 
"naked statistical evidence." See Kaye, Book Review, 89 YALE L.J. 601, 603 (1980). 
Cohn's argument against statistical inference is vital to his claim that Statistical Proof of 
.Discrimination "fails to draw a sharp distinction between [causal inferences and statistical in-
ferences] and misleads the reader by suggesting that statistical significance tests indicate the 
strength of the causal inference that the defendant's discrimination caused group differences in 
outcome." Cohn, supra note 12, at 1302. This criticism seems overdrawn in view of Baldus's 
and Cole's admonition that "the test of significance speaks only to whether there is some differ-
ence in the universe . . . . [S]tatistical tests can tell us nothing, directly, about the cause of an 
adverse impact .... [T)he test provides no basis for assigning a precise probability to possi-
ble causes." P. 320. But see note 42 infra. 
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a fact-finder could simply try to intuit how likely it is that this differ-
ence results from something other than the luck of the draw. But 
why should we not use valid statistical tools to provide the fact-
finder with additional information that is pertinent to his assessment 
of this likelihood?39 
C. P-Va/ues 
With respect to the formal statistical methods that might be em-
ployed, I have already argued that testing the null hypothesis at a 
fixed significance level such as .05, as in Hazelwood, is inadvisable.40 
I would only add that if strict hypothesis testing is used, some indica-
tion of the so-called "power'' of the test or related quantities should 
be given.41 Baldus and Cole favor the more flexible procedure of 
39. To be sure, unless we were to modify radically our legal procedures, most of the evi-
dence in a discrimination case will have to be weighed intuitively, and in the end the statistical 
evidence may have to be judged along with the qualitative evidence in some intuitive fashion. 
Nonetheless, statistical techniques can aid in this intuitive process. CJ. p. 317 ("one is in a 
better position to assess the long-run effects of a rule with the help of statistical tests than 
without"). 
40. See note 31 supra and accompanying text. 
4 I. The power of a test is the probability that it correctly rejects the null hypothesis. It is 
the complement of the probability that the test will accept the null hypothesis when that hy-
pothesis is false. This latter probability is - or should be - of great interest in formulating or 
evaluating an hypothesis test. If it is high, the test rarely will detect the defendant's discrimi-
nation. If it is low, the test is sensitive to the presence of discrimination - it is powerful. 
Unfortunately, the relationship between this probability and a test's significance level is 
complex, and it tends to be ignored in discussions of statistical proof of discrimination. E.g., 
C. SULLNAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 21; Braun, supra note 21. But see 
Dawson,Are Statisticians Being Fair lo Employment .Discrimination Plainl!/fs, 21 JURIMETRICS 
J. 1 (1980) (examining the power of hypothesis tests that use chi-square as the test statistic), 
Baldus and Cole do not address the topic (presumably because they argue against formal hy-
pothesis tests in the first flace), and except in a footnote at page 291, they make no explicit 
mention of this probability. 
Accordingly, a brief description of the issue may be in order. In designing or adopting a 
hypothesis test, one should keep two factors in mind: the probability that the test will reject 
the null hypothesis when that hypothesis is in fact true, and the probability that the test will 
fail to reject the null hypothesis even though that hypothesis is false. The first probability 
measures the chance of what is variously called a type I error, a false rejection, a false positive 
or a false alarm. Customarily denoted by the Greek letter ex, it is nothing other than the 
significance level of the test. The second probability quantifies the chance of the opposite type 
of error - a type II error, a false acceptance, a false negative, or an undetected signal. Cus-
tomarily denoted by /3, its value is typically far harder to discern. It is not, as one might think, 
1-cx. · 
The hypothesis test outlined in Hazelwood illustrates the situation. In always rejecting the 
null hypothesis ofno discrimination at a significance level of cx=.05, the Court will erroneously 
reject this hypothesis five percent of the time, since five percent of the cases triggering rejection 
will occur due to chance alone, and the null hypothesis asserts the existence of such chance 
results. On the other hand, suppose the null hypothesis is false. What is the probability that 
the test will not detect this fact? It is not l-cx=.95. The alternative to the null hypothesis in 
the Court's test is that the chance that each black applicant will be hired differs from .057, the 
proportion of blacks in the relevant labor market. It could be .056, .999, .030303, or any other 
number other than .057 between zero and one. For each such number - and the possibilities 
are infinite - there is some probability that the test will still accept the null hypothesis. Imag-
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presenting the p-value, that is, the probability that the measured dis-
crepancy is merely a chance fluctuation, one that would disappear in 
an examination of the defendant's long-run behavior.42 The Hazel-
wood Court, it will be recalled, compared the "observed number'' of 
black teachers hired over a two-year period (15) to the "expected 
number" (23) derived from a probabilistic model in which the 
chance of hiring a black teacher was .057 in each instance. The 
Court took the .057 figure from the areawide data on the proportion 
of black teachers in the suburban area, and it used the sample size 
(the number of teachers, 405, who actually applied for positions in 
the two-year period) to conclude (using the normal approximation to 
the binomial distribution) that the p-value fell below the .05 signifi-
cance level (using a two-tailed test). Had the Court followed 
Baldus's and Cole's recommendation, and merely stated the p-value, 
it would have noted that under the posited model of no discrimina-
tion the probability that no more than fifteen blacks would have 
been hired is only .042.43 The calculation of such a quantity, Baldus 
and Cole suggest, is ordinarily the task of the expert, but the evalua-
tion of this number - which is an aspect of the assessment of the 
probative force of the statistical evidence - lies within the peculiar 
province of the judge or jury.44 
ine, for example, that each black applicant stood a .047 chance of being hired. The resulting 
probability of a gap as large or larger than the difference between the associated expected 
number (19) and the observed number (15) would then be about .14. Thus, there is a .86 
probability that the Court's hypothesis test would not detect any discrimination in Hazel-
wood's hiring practices even if those procedures reduced each black teacher's chance of being 
hired from .057 to .047 (a reduction of 18 percent, depriving ten out of every thousand black 
applicants of positions). When it comes to detecting this degree of discrimination, the Court's 
test is not very powerful. The chance of a false alarm is small (.05), but the chance of an 
undetected signal is large (.86). 
For elementary, but more complete descriptions of the power of hypothesis tests, see, e.g., 
Y. CHOU, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 283-96 (2d ed. 1975); B. LINDGREN, G. MCELRATH & D. 
BERRY, INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS 186-93 (4th ed. 1978). For a re-
vealing but rather mathematical treatment of hypothesis testing from the standpoint of signal 
detection theory, see J. MELSA & D. COHN, DECISION AND EsTIMATION THEORY 21-53 (1978). 
42. This characterization is oversimplified. The p-value is computed on the assumption 
that the null hypothesis is true. The null hypothesis entails a particular probability model with 
specific parameters. See note 59 iefra. In Hazelwood, for example, the Court assumed that 
selection was a Bernoulli process with the binomial parameter 8 = .057. Consequently, a very 
small p-value suggests that either the parameter has some other value (8 ;I, .057) or that the 
form of the model is wrong (selection of teachers is not a Bernoulli process). Cf. pp. 290-93 
(discussing the use ofp-values in disparate treatment cases to reject a Bernoulli model in favor 
of some other model involving "legitimate selection criteria" or "defendant's bias," and in this 
way linking "causal inference" with "statistical inference"). 
43. This is the p-value that would be used implicitly in a one-tailed test. See note 32 supra. 
For a two-tailed test, one would compare, in effect, the probability that the number of blacks 
hired would be less than 16 or greater than 30 with the preset value a. This two-sided p-value 
is .084, which is greater than a = .05 - the result mistakenly emphasized by the Court. 
44. P. 308. Cf. R.A. FISHER (1955), quoted in A.W.F. EDWARDS, LIKELIHOOD: AN Ac-
COUNT OF THE STATISTICAL CONCEPT OF LIKELIHOOD AND ITS APPLICATION TO SCIENTIFIC 
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On pragmatic grounds, a few commentators question the desira-
bility of producing p-values. Kairys, Kadane, and Lehoczky have 
written that it "involves complicated calculations resulting in an-
swers that are difficult to visualize and evaluate," and they complain 
that "[e]ven with moderate sample sizes, small disparities result in 
very low probabilities."45 Yet, the calculation of the p-values is not 
difficult, and the concept of sampling error or measurement noise is 
not beyond a court's comprehension. That with moderate or large 
samples even trivial differences can have small p-values and there-
fore appear statistically significant should not trick most fact-finders 
into thinking that such a disparity is also legally significant.46 This 
concern does underscore the admonition that p-values should not be 
considered in a vacuum, but the courts are not likely to shut their 
eyes to the possibility that although the group difference is statisti-
cally significant, the degree of discrimination is itself de minimis. 
For these reasons, the use of p-values as Baldus and Cole recom-
mend seems superior to the alternatives of doing nothing in the way 
of formal inference or of deciding according to rigid, classical hy-
pothesis tests. 
D. Prediction Intervals 
Still, there is one more classical technique that promises to con-
vey yet more information to assist the court in arriving at an ulti-
mately intuitive assessment of the evidence. It is most easily 
described in the context of an example, so I shall return to the Hazel-
wood case once more. Both the computation of the p-value and the 
standard deviation "rule," or hypothesis test, use a "point estimate" 
of twenty-three for the "expected number" of blacks hired. In other 
words, these methods suppose that if repeated samples of 405 appli-
cants were to be assessed under the Court's simple probability model 
and if these samples were to be pooled, then the proportion of black 
teachers in the ensuing collection of successful applicants would ap-
INFERENCE, at v (1972) ("We [statisticians] have the duty of formulating, of summarizing, and 
of communicating our conclusions in intelligible form, in recognition of the right of other free 
minds to utilize them in making their own decisions"). Arguably, the p-value could be better 
assessed if a statement of the power of an hypothesis test that treats the observed disparity as 
(barely) significant were provided. See note 41 supra. 
45. Kairys, Kadane & Lehoczky, Jury Representativeness: Mandate far Multiple Source 
Lists, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 776, 794 (1977). These objections are offered in the context of jury 
selection cases. Kairys, Kadane, and Lehoczky note that "[t]he problem of sample size is not 
so acute in employment discrimination cases" because "the sample size is the number of peo-
ple hired and is typically small." Id at 794 n.101. 
46. Baldus and Cole caution against this erroneous interpretation of statistical significance. 
See pp. 317-20. 
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proach 23/405. In the limit (as the pooled sample grew to engulf the 
entire population of teachers in the relevant labor market47), the ob-
served proportion would be the population proportion of 23/405. 
But probability theory permits us to provide more than a point esti-
mate of the number of successful blacks. Given the Court's 
probability model, it is easy enough to compute an "interval esti-
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Figure 1. Prediction intervals for the number of black teachers 
hired out of 405 applicants assuming that the probability of hiring a 
black teacher is .057 in each instance. The observed number of 
black teachers hired is 15, which lies outside the .90 prediction inter-
val but inside the .95 prediction interval. The disparity is therefore 
significant at the .10 level, but not at the .05 level, using a two-tail 
test. 
All the intervals are centered about the previous point estimate of 
twenty-three, and the wider the interval, the more likely it is that the 
number of blacks actually hired from a group of 405 applicants will 
be included in the predicted interval. For example, the probability 
that the number of blacks will be between eighteen and twenty-eight 
is .75. In contrast, if we choose a wider prediction interval, say one 
that runs between sixteen and thirty, we can be more confident that 
the number of blacks hired will fall within the interval. Specifically, 
the probability that this range of outcomes will contain the observed 
outcome is .90. Saying the same thing another way, we predict that 
the observed number will lie outside the interval [16,30] in only one 
sample of 405 out of every ten.49 The fact that the observed number 
47. Since the pool of potential applicants changes as some teachers enter the market while 
others leave, the population size is infinite. 
48. Prediction intervals are akin to, but conceptually distinct from "confidence intervals." 
Statistical Proof of .Discrimination gives a clear explanation of confidence "intervals and their 
relation top-values and significance tests. Pp. 310-13. 
49. The perceptive reader will recognize from this example that the confidence level p is 
intimately related to the significance level a. Namely, p = 1-a. Consequently, interval esti-
mates can readily be used to perform significance tests. 
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does fall just outside this range (it is 15) reveals that either (1) we just 
happen to have before us one of the unusual cases that arise ten per-
cent of the time, or (2) the Court's no-discrimination model is a poor 
description of the long-run characteristics of the hiring process. 
This type of presentation is more elaborate than a terse statement 
that the probability of picking no more than fifteen blacks on 405 
tries would be .042 if the probability on each try were .057. While its 
import is essentially the same as that of the p-value,50 it should be 
useful in helping a court visualize the statistical issue and therefore 
should be made available to supplement the p-value itself.51 
Ill. NONCLASSICAL ANALYSES 
A. Likelihood 
Although the full conceptual apparatus of p-values, prediction 
intervals, and significance tests was not fashioned until the late 
1920s,52 these techniques have already earned the sobriquet "classi-
cal." Contemporary statisticians all agree that these techniques are 
of some use in evaluating limited observations of long-run phenom-
ena. At the same time, many prominent statisticians believe that 
other methods deal more effectively with the problem of statistical 
inference. To appreciate these competing approaches, we must be 
clear about the nature of ihe problem. As one leading text on mathe-
matical statistics explains: 
A problem of statistical inference or, more simply, a statistics problem 
50. Since the .042 p-value is one-sided (it measures the probability that the number of 
blacks selected would not exceed fifteen if each black's chance of selection were .057), it is 
more closely connected with one-sided prediction intervals. I have displayed two-sided predic-
tion intervals in the text only because it seems to me that these are slightly easier to grasp. The 
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Since 15 is outside the prediction interval for p = .95, the small number of blacks hired is 
significant at the .05 level (using the one-tailed test). 
51. Cf. p. 310 (''the confidence interval answers a broader question than that addressed by 
tests of significance"); Natrella, The Relation Between Confidence Intervals and Tests of Sign!ft• 
cance, 14 AM. STATISTICIAN 20 (1960) (advocating more widespread use of confidence inter• 
vals in statistical studies). 
52. See, e.g., Dudycha, Behavioral Statistics: An Historical Perspective, in R. KIRK, supra 
note 28, at 2, 21-24. 
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is a problem in which data that have been generated in accordance 
with some unknown probability distribution must be analyzed and 
some type of inference about the unknown distribution must be made. 
In other words, in a statistics problem there are two or more 
probability distributions which might have generated some given ex-
perimental data. In some problems there could be an infinite number 
of different possible distributions which might have generated the data. 
By analyzing the data, we attempt to learn about the unknown distri-
bution, to make some inference about certain properties of the distri-
bution, and to determine the relative likelihood that each possible 
distribution is actually the correct one.53 
This is precisely what the Court was attempting to do in Hazelwood. 
Looking at sample data (involving 405 applicants over a two-year 
period), the Court asked whether it was reasonably likely that the 
unknown distribution giving rise to the data (summarized by the 
sample statistic that fifteen blacks were hired) was a so-called bino-
mial distribution whose parameter was .057. 54 Because the 
probability of the observed number's being generated by this distri-
bution was a bit more than .05 (calculated by a two-tailed test), the 
Court suggested that its tentative guess about the nature and details 
of the unknown distribution was pretty good. 
Upon reflection, however, this reasoning seems to leave out a 
crucial ingredient. It certainly tells us something about how well the 
binomial no-discrimination model fits the data, but it reveals nothing 
about the accuracy of other models. If, under a revised model of the 
hiring process, the probability of the observed statistic ~ould be 
higher than that calculated under the Court's version, then this other 
model would seem to emerge as a more likely prospect for the un-
known distribution. While one must be wary of "overfitting" a 
model to the data, a systematic way to look at the relative likelihood 
of various hypotheses about the unknown distribution is available. 
This procedure requires the construction of a "relative likelihood 
function," a task that is not as complicated as it might sound. Let us 
denote the unknown parameter of the posited binomial distribution 
by the Greek letter 8, and let X stand for the number of black teach-
ers actually hired.55 So far, we have treated X as a variable whose 
53. M. DEGROOT, PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS 257 (1975). 
54. A binomial distribution describes the probability of the number of "successes" for 
some number of trials, where the outcome of any one trial is independent of the outcome of 
any other trial. The probability of a success on any particular trial is a "parameter" of this 
binomial distribution. See, e.g., id at 201. The probabilities of the various possible numbers 
of heads obtained by flipping a fair coin ten times are given by a binomial distribution with the 
parameters ten (for the number or trials, or the sample size) and .5 (for the probability of a 
success on each trial). 
55. The Court's approach tests the "null hypothesis' that 8 = .057 against the "alternative 
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value is determined by the luck of the draw - that is, by random 
sampling from an infinite population characterized by the binomial 
distribution whose parameter 8 is .057. Now we treat X asjixed-
the school district hired fifteen blacks - but we think of 8 as a varia-
ble that can take on values between zero and one. For each such 
value of 8, there is some probability Pr(15;8) of obtaining the statistic 
X=15 from the sample of 405 applicants. One special value of 8, 
which we designate 8, maximizes this probability Pr(15;8). That is, 
the probability of observing X= 15 is highest when 8 = 8. It turns 
out, although I shall not prove it, that this maximum likelihood esti-
mator of 8 is 8 = 15/405. 
All this talk of 8's, 8's, and related probabilities may sound com-
plicated, but the idea expressed should be intuitively plausible. Ifwe 
flip a possibly unfair coin ten times, knowing nothing about how the 
coin is weighted, and we observe a total of three heads, it is more 
likely that the coin has a probability 8 = 3/10 of coming up heads on 
each toss than that the coin is weighted in some other way.56 In this 
case, 8 would be 3/10. Since 8 maximizes Pr(15;8), it can serve as a 
standard against which to judge other hypotheses about the true 
value of 8. Suppose, for instance, someone exclaimed that in the 
Hazelwood case 8 was not 8 = 15/405, but some larger number, say 
23/405. We might respond by designating this newly suggested 
value of 8 as 81 and calculating Pr(15;81)/Pr(15; 8). The number 
would tell us how likely it is that 8 = 81 = 23/405 relative to the 
more likely possibility that 8 = 8 = 15/405. Calling this ratio the 
relative likelihood of 81 and denoting it by R(15;81), it is not hard to 
show that R(15;8 1) = .19. In light of the observed value of X, the 
hypothesis that 8 = 81 = 23/405 is about a fifth as likely as the hy-
pothesis that 8 = 8 = 15/405. We can now repeat this procedure for 
82 = some other possible value of 8 - for 83, and so on. Doggedly, 
the statistician (or his computer) finds the values of the relative like-
lihood function R(X;8). Figure 2 shows this function for the Hazel-
wood situation. Scanning such a graph should give the factfinder a 
feeling for the plausible range of the true value of 8. 
hypothesis" that 8 ~ .057. But, as the test is implemented by the Court, we learn nothing about 
the probability of obtaining the sample statistic under this alternative hypothesis. Computing 
this probability is no easy task. An entire family of binomial distributions in which the param-
eter 8 takes on all the values (except .057) between zero and one must be considered. See note 
41 supra. 
56. Anyone inclined to say that the coin is not likely to be this biased and probably is 
characterized by a 8 closer to .5, is almost surely being influenced by his prior beliefs about the 
prevalence of weighted coins. Likelihood methods, like classical inferential techniques, ignore 
prior beliefs. The accepted statistical method for incorporating prior beliefs into the inference 
problem is described at note 67 infra and accompanying text. 
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Figure 2. Relative likelihood function R(X;8) for selecting X = 15 
blacks out of 405 applicants where the probability of selecting each 
black applicant is 8. The likelihood that 8 = .057 (which corre-
sponds to the Hazelwood Court's no-discrimination hypothesis) is 
about 18% of the likelihood that 8 = .037 (which is the most likely 
value of 8 looking only to the number of blacks hired). 
It bears emphasizing that the statistical analysis merely produces 
the picture. Defining the plausible range is not a mathematical oper-
ation. 57 That is a question for a judge or jury. The purpose of gen-
erating a graph of the relative likelihood function is merely to give 
57. Likelihood intervals can be defined to capture those values of 8 that yield relative 
likelihoods above a fixed amount. See, e.g., J. KALBFLEISCH, PROBABILITY AND STATISTICAL 
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the factfinder more guidance than the classical p-value affords him. 
Anyone who looks carefully at Figure 2 must wonder about the Ha-
zelwood Court's suggestion that .057 is a convincing value for 0. If 
the hiring process involves independent trials as the Court's null hy-
pothesis presupposes, 58 then it is hard to believe ( on a preponderance· 
of the evidence standard, looking solely to the statistical evidence) 
that the probability that a black applicant will be hired is as high as 
.057. And, if it is lower than .057, black applicants do not have the 
same chance of being hired as white applicants do.59 
I fear that much of this likelihood analysis will seem confusing -
too abstract, or at the other extreme, too mired in the details of a 
messy example.60 I have devoted substantial space to illustrating the 
rudiments of the likelihood theory because I think it has some poten-
tial for use in discrimination litigation. Admittedly, it is not nearly 
so familiar a way of thinking about the problem of statistical infer-
ence as are the classical methods that Baldus and Cole so ably dis-
cuss. Yet, any statistician who has seriously studied the 
fundamentals of inference should admit that the likelihood function 
contains all the information that the statistical findings can convey. 
It forces the fact-finder to confront all the hypotheses concerning the 
parameters of a probability distribution, and it avoids the arbitrary 
character of hypothesis testing at a uniform significance level. I 
would not say that it should replace p-values and prediction inter-
vals (and their close cousins, confidence intervals), but it can supple-
ment these standard methods. 
B. Bayesian Inference 
At this point, it might be wise to look back over the territory that 
we have traversed. We have seen (or, rather, I have asserted) that 
within the framework of a statistical model, the likelihood function 
contains all the information that the data provide concerning the rel-
INFERENCE II 22-27 (1979). But, as with prediction or confidence intervals, what threshold 
figure to use is not a question that mathematics can answer. See note 44 supra. 
58. Note 38 defends the general use of the binomial distribution model where the question 
is whether the disparity in group outcomes is not only practically important, but also statisti-
cally reliable enough to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. 
59. Perhaps they should not have the same chance. Maybe white applicants are generally 
more qualified than their black counterparts. But that is a point that the school district could 
raise -with the aid of a more sophisticated statistical model of the hiring process if need be -
to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination. See note 38 supra. 
60. For a relatively simple description of likelihood theory using other examples, see 
Sprott & Kalbfleisch, Use of the Likelihood Function in Inference, 64 PSYCH. BULL. 15 (1965). 
A.W.F. Edwards, supra note 44, gives a philosophically oriented survey of likelihood theory. 
For more detailed mathematical presentations, see, e.g., J. KALBFLEISCH, supra note 57; D. 
FRASER, THE STRUCTURE OF INFERENCE 185-88, 295-316 (1968). 
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ative merits of the possible hypotheses. The prediction interval 
states a range within which the data would be expected to fall if the 
nondiscrimination version of the model applies. The p-value gives 
the probability that the data would be as observed in the specific 
version of this same model of the selection or allocation process that 
entails no discrimination. Oddly, none of these statistical constructs 
tells us what we really want to extract from the statistical evidence in 
a lawsuit: the probability, computed in light of the sample data, that 
the defendant's selection or allocation process involves disparate 
treatment or impact. Thus, in the Hazelwood situation, we have ex-
amined such things as Pr(X ~ 1518 = .057) - the probability that X, 
the number of black teachers hired out of 405 applicants, would be 
fifteen or fewer, given that each black applicant had the same .057 
chance of being hired - and R(X;8) - the relative likelihood that 8 
has various values, including but not limited to .057.61 As yet, we 
have exhibited no calculations of Pr(8 = .0571X = 15) - the 
probability, conditioned on the observation that the school district 
hired fifteen blacks, that each black applicant had the same .057 
chance of being hired. 
Neither likelihood methods nor classical techniques of inference 
can ever produce this figure. Yet, there is a rich body of statistical 
theory that permits such calculations. It goes by the name Bayesian 
inference. 62 As is true of likelihood methods, it is not used as widely 
as the classical theories, but it is becoming increasingly influential. 63 
Bayesian inference employs likelihood ideas in a distinctive way. 
It uses the likelihood function64 to convert a "prior'' probability dis-
61. This example may clarify the point that the important quantities in classical as well as 
likelihood theories are computed within the framework of a statistical model. As I have previ-
ously noted, see note 42 supra, that model in this instance is called a Bernoulli model in which 
the probability of a "success" on each trial is some fixed number 8, which is called the parame-
ter of the model. See note 54 supra. Classical calculations (with the important exception of 
the power function mentioned in note 41 supra) take the value of this parameter to be fixed 
(for example, at .057). This version of the general model with the parameter so specified is 
what is meant by the "null hypothesis." Likelihood methods presuppose the same general 
model but treat the parameter 8 as a variable and thereby permit the decision-maker to assess 
the innumerable versions of the model ignored by classical calculations ofp-values and predic-
tion intervals. 
62. It should not be confused with the Bayesian, or subjective interpretation of probability 
( on which it builds). See Kaye, Tlze Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. CHI. L. 
Rev. 34, 50-52 n.56 (1979). This article lists several texts that explain Bayesian inference. See 
generally M. DEGROOT, supra note 53; J. KALBFLEISCH, supra note 57, at 288-94; B. LIN-
DGREN, G. MCELRATH & D. BERRY, supra note 41, at 219-32. 
63. See, e.g., Schum, A Review of a Case Against Blaise Pascal and His Heirs, 77 MICH. L. 
Rev. 446, 468 (1979). 
64. The likelihood function L(X;8) differs only slightly from the relative likelihood func-
tion R(X;8). The latter is but a special case of the former. 
854 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 80:833 
tribution that characterizes an observer's belief65 (about a population 
parameter such as 8) into a "posterior'' distribution that takes ac-
count of the sample observations. For example, in the case of the 
coin that came up heads three times out of ten, 66 I asserted that the 
most likely value of a head appearing on each independent toss was 
3/10. This number is the maximum likelihood estimate of 8, the 
extent to which the coin is weighted, in light of the limited data 
available. But if there were some prior reason to believe that the 
coin was in reality evenly balanced (perhaps the owner of the coin, a 
trustworthy soul, assured us that it is not a trick coin), we might be 
troubled by the idea of embracing 3/10 as our best estimate of 8. 
The 3/10 :figure is plainly relevant, but must it be determinative? 
Bayesian analysis uses the sample data - the outcomes of the ten 
tosses - to revise the prior belief. Depending on the strength of the 
initial view that the coin is evenly balanced, a Bayesian would arrive 
at a point estimate that would put 8 somewhere between .3 and .5. 
The formal scheme for prescribing the impact of sample data on 
a prior distribution could be adapted to legal proceedings, although 
not as easily in discrimination cases67 as in certain other contexts. 68 
Baldus and Cole toy with the idea but curtly dismiss it, partly be-
cause "courts are even less familiar with Bayesian methods than they 
are with the methods of classical statistics."69 Although it is difficult 
65. Those who object in principle to Bayesian methods usually deny that it makes sense to 
take a probability distribution as characterizing belief. See, e.g., G. SHAFER, A THEORY OF 
EVIDENCE (1976); Brilmayer & Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal .Deci-
sions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 116 (1978). Of course, Bayes's rule can work with "objective" prior 
probability distributions instead of subjective ones. See J. KALBFLEISCH, supra note 57, at 291; 
Kaye, supra note 62. 
66. See note 54 supra and accompanying text. 
67. Sketching how one might proceed should convey some of the flavor of the difficulty of 
institutionalizing Bayesian inference in the law. In a case like Hazelwood, where the plaintiff 
alleged racial discrimination in hiring, the judge or jury could consider initially the plaintiffs 
nonstatistical evidence - testimony about the opportunities for discriminatory decisions, re-
marks of personnel managers evincing racial bias, and the like - as well as figures on the 
proportion of blacks in the relevant labor market or applicant pool. Under one approach, the 
fact-finder could then draw a curve on a chart, a curve that would reach its peak at the fact-
finder's best estimate of 8 and that would spread out in accordance with the fact-finder's confi-
dence in this estimate. A statistician could derive the likelihood function from the sample data 
and apply it to this prior distribution via Bayes's rule to generate the posterior distribution. 
This distribution would supply the probability that 8 is less than the proportion of blacks in the 
relevant population. A less confining elaboration of this procedure 1s given in the text accom-
panying note 70 infta. 
68. See Finkelstein & Fairley,A Bayesian Approach to Ident!fication Evidence, 83 HARV. L. 
REv. 489 (1970); Fairley, .Probability Analysis of Ident!fication Evidence, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 1205 
(1973); Lindley, A .Problem in Forensic Science, 64 BIOMETRIKA 207 (1977). 
69. P. 304 n.32. After a brief allusion to the "lively debate [in the Harvard Law Review] 
on the applicability of Bayesian methods to legal questions" they add that "[w]e know of no 
court that has applied Bayesian methods to an evidentiary problem." Id But see Arizona v. 
Wagner, No. DR122023 (Super. Ct., Maricopa County, Ariz. 1980); Everett v. Everett, No. D-
March 1982) The Numbers Game 855 
to treat this as a serious argument, 70 Baldus and Cole also comment 
that "there is no judicially acceptable way we know of to quantify 
. . . the prior distribution" (p. 304). Presumably, they have in mind 
Professor Tribe's forceful critique of "trial by mathematics."71 How-
ever, Tribe's arguments are not all of the same high caliber, and the 
most penetrating are blunted or sidestepped by circumspect proce-
dures for exposing judges or juries to Bayesian logic.72 Such proce-
dures would not dictate the choice of" the final distribution or the 
result in the case; they would merely demonstrate the probative force 
of the sample data by displaying the effect of the data across a pano-
ply of prior distributions. A fact-finder would be free to start with 
any distribution that reflected his prior estimate of the unknown pa-
rameter, or to remain uncommitted to any specific estimate. He 
could merely see how strongly the likelihood function for the sample 
data affects various prior probability statements. For example, start-
ing from the agnostic premise in Hazelwood that 0 is no more likely 
to have one value between 0 and I than any other leads to the con-
clusion that, in light of the observed hiring rate, the probability that 
the true value of 0 is less than .057 (!.e., that selection is discrimina-
tory in terms of the Court's model) is a bit over 95 percent. 
I make these points primarily to give Bayesian methodology its 
fair hearing. I, too, would not urge its implementation in discrimi-
nation litigation. Even if the flexible use of Bayesian calculations 
would be no more confusing to the fact-finder than the alternatives, 
it would not provide that much additional guidance to the fact-
finder. Some resort to intuition still would be essential, and the mar-
ginal guidance from seeing the results on a cross section of distribu-
tions does not seem large enough to justify implementing the 
procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
Lawyers and statisticians make strange bedfellows. Both are 
skilled ( or should be) in the analysis of evidence. Yet, the two pro-
850-370 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, Cal. 1981); Ellman & Kaye, Probabilities and Proofl 
Can HLA and Blood Tests Prove Paternity, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1131 (1979); Kaye, supra note 
62, at 34 n.5 (referring to other cases applying Bayesian methods to an evidentiary problem, 
although not necessarily in a considered or deliberate way). 
70. The argument from unfamiliarity is weak at best. See Ellman & Kaye, supra note 69, 
at 1158. It is especially troublesome in a work that aspires to be a response to "[t]he challenge 
. . . to weigh intelligently the strengths and weaknesses of the available methods and to use 
them creatively to focus on what is at issue under the substantive law." P.3. 
71. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. 
REV. 1329 (1971). 
72. Ellman & Kaye, supra note 69, at 1154-57. 
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fessions often reach apparently divergent conclusions about what 
counts as "evidence" and about what inferences can properly be 
drawn from such evidence.73 Indeed, the legal profession has long 
resisted the allure of quantified methods of proof, partly out of the 
realization that values other than accuracy in factfinding are some-
times central to the proper resolution of legal disputes.74 Neverthe-
less, the ability to ascertain the true state of affairs is important, and 
there are instances in which statistical data can enhance the quality 
of judicial decision-making. Especially in discrimination litigation, 
quantitative analysis is becoming, if not de rigeur, at least an ac-
cepted method of proof. Statistical Proof of .Discrimination repre-
sents a sustained effort to make this kind of analysis understandable 
and useful to attorneys and courts involved in such litigation. There 
is surely more to be said on the subject, 75 but Statistical Proof is an 
excellent contribution to a burgeoning cross-disciplinary literature. 
Read in conjunction with a good elementary statistics textbook, 76 it 
can be an invaluable guide to the perplexed. 
73. L.J. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977). 
14. See Tribe, supra note 71. 
75. The National Academy of Sciences' Committee on National Statistics is studying the 
use of statistics in litigation, and the National Science Foundation has funded a University of 
Minnesota study along these same lines. In addition, an exchange of papers on many of the 
issues canvassed in this Review as well as some related ones is scheduled for publication in the 
Journal of the American Statistical Association. 
76. Nicely written works that use a minimum of mathematics include G. KIMBLE, How TO 
USE (AND MISUSE) STATISTICS (1978); D. MOORE, supra note 28; J. PHILLIPS, JR., STATISTICAL 
THINKING: A STRUCTURAL APPROACH (1973); E. WILLEMSON, UNDERSTANDING STATISTI· 
CAL REASONING: How TO EVALUATE REsEARCH LITERATURE IN THE BEHAVORIAL SCIENCES 
(1974). 
